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I. INTRODUCTION
Yom Kippur war of 1971 between Egypt and Israel
is known to be the first all electronic warfare (EW) .In
the Gulf War of 1991, the US has deployed powerful
and sophisticated electronic. measures and
countermeasures in such magnitude that literally no
Iraqi equipment has worked in the beginning for two
to three days. Gulf war gave a demonstration of the
power of EW and it is a watershed in the history of
war. It is clear that unless we have mastery in the field
of EW, our very survival is threatened. Strategic
electronics playa vital role in survival. An analysis of
strategic electronics and strategy to survive are
presented in this communication.
When we consider where we are, which way we are
heading and which way we intend to go, it is essential
that we remember the words of the first strategist,
Napoleon who said. "he who does not read history is
condemned to repeat it".
In UK, important military studies are conducted and
reported in a journal by Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI). According to its perception, all nations are
caught in 'Technology Trap.t.2. The U S call it by a
different name, Calvin Coolidge Syndrome3.
2. TECHNOLOGY TRAP
Figure I illustrates the technology trap. The dots
show the cost of a single US aircraft from the time of
concept through prototype, evaluation and induction
into service. This is shown against GNP and the Defence
budget of the corresponding period. The early aircraft
was made using wooden frame. tin sheet, and piano
wire to control. During World War II the escalation in
cost is evident, as it is quickly realised that an aircraft
is a war winning machine. (Incidentally, it is Italy that
first used an aircraft as war machine to drop bombs on
Lib)~~.. As more and more science and technology is
incorporated to make the machine more effective, it is
becoming more expensive. Extrapolation from 1938 to
2020 reveals, that US cannot afford more than one
aircraft of the state-of-the art. UK estimates that its
economy will fail to support by the year 2000, a fleet
of no more than one submarine, one aircraft and QJle
ship. This is technology trap.
This situation has come about as a logical
consequence of the fact that as each generation of new
military equipment is becoming more and more capable
and sophisticated, each generation is becoming less
numervus. At the begining of World War II, UK had
2000 aircraft; at the end of the war the production rate
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was more than 3000 per month. Today, one may ask
why one cannot have a squadron of Lancasters for the
price of one Jaguar or Mirage 2000. Today's defence
electronics and early warning radars on ground and in
space are so advanced, that none of these Lancaster
bombers will be able to reach the border, much less
penetrate the defences and inflict any damage. Thus,
though less in number, more advanced versions of
Jaguars, Mirages and MiG 29s are essential in modern
warfare.
And here lies the paradox: however effective that
ultimate and expensive aircraft (few in inventory) may
be, should the enemy, either by pure chance or by sheer
ingenuity, shoot it down, the war is lost. This is the
road to absurdity; it is on account of technology trap.
On all accounts, we seem to be going down a one-way
street. Calvin Coolidge Syndrome (Fig. 2) is self
explanatory .It is the American view that the fighter
pilots are already reaching the biological barrier ,
wherein, they will not be able to cope with the
~
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Figure 2. The calvin coolidge syndrome
impending equipment demands, information overload,
and physically bear up the 'G' forces. The point may
be round the corner to return to less sophisticated lower
performance fighters that are more compatible with
their human drivers, and put more performance into
weapons.
3. THE TECHNOLOGY
There appears to be a lack of appreciation of the
timelag between concept and product, even in the minds
of the people connected with Defence, not to mention
the public at large. Two factors related to technology
are critical, and need to be appreciated. More so, as
technology is accused of always delivering less, arriving
late, and costing too much.
New technology and capabilities are limited by the
vulnerabilities that they carry with them. Let us take a
simple case to illustrate the point. From the days of
Vikings and Phoenecians, sailboats were both the means
of travel as well as war winning machines. Attached
with a long shaft in the front, the technique of warfare
used to be to ram into the enemy ships, board the vessel
and combat. The fuel is free and as long as well charted
coastline is in sight, long distance travel was possible
limited only by the strength of the oarsmen aboard and
the cannibals ashore. Come the steam engine,
navigation and Naval warfare has changed. Steam
engine, combined with age old Archimedes screw used
as propeller, gave the ship independence from the
vagaries of the weather and wind, gave speed and
manoeuvrability to run, re-group and attack. This rosy
picture carried with it the penalty that the ship had to
carry its own fuel, and hence the range of operation
was limited by the fuel and rations it could carry. The
routes were tied to fuel supply lines and these needed
to be defended. Soon followed colonisation for the coal
and mineral mines were not near the ports. To maintain
the co,lonies, militar:y stepped in. Larger ships with ow.n
fuel and army needed larger displacement, resulting in
larger decks where larger guns can be mounted to fire
at enemy shIps at farther ranges. For self protection
against enemy attack, thicker arm our plates were
needed leading again to larger displacement and more
space to keep bigger guns. The construction of
Dreadnoughts however came to decline with the advent
of torpedos and mines, and their days were numbered
with the arrival of submarines. Naval history took a
new turn. 'Thus each new innovation and technology
brought with it new vulnerabilities and what was
considered invincible before war suddenly became
vulnerable'. History of land and air warfare is replete
with similar trends.
The rate of innovation in military svhere with the
application of new mathematical, material and scientific
techniques is faster than the production and
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development cycle can cope with. New weapons become
based on obsolete technology before they enter service.
'Thus methods of mass production in short notice is as
much a war winning technology as the weapon itself. ,
4. WAR WINNING TECHNOLOGY
Science takes no sides. Nations driven by
politico-economic considerations engage intellectuals to
engineer the physical phenomena and materials to build
weapons systems to win a war. A model of war winn.inb
technology is presented in Fig. 3. Of a number of such
engineered versions, one becomes a decisive weapon
that wins the war. Immediately; all countries -acquire
them in quantity and add to their inventory .Here we
are confronted with a dilemma.
technology. Unfortunately this cannot be predicted. We
therefore focus our attention on four factors:
(a) Bringing together mature technologies in an
innovative way is the key to war winning
technology. For example, barbed wire was war
winning technology in World War I. Inspite of
Gaattling repeating riffle, World War 1 ended up
in a long drawn trench warfare. The trenches were
protected by the barbed wire (developed in US to
keep livestock within ranches) and effectively
checked the progress of troops. It is almost at the
end of the war that army could be persuaded to
try a tank2. The idea that an automobile, which
was under mass production by Ford and others for
25 years, could be converted into a tracked vehicle
to run over barbed wire and bridge over trenches,
changed history. The tank, which appeared almost
at the end of the war at the battle front,
immediately proved itself as the war winning
technology. History is replete with such instal1ces
where bringing together mature technologies like
barbed wire, automobile, aircraft carrier, jet
engine and missile produced war winning
technologies.
(b) A Wonderful equation or an invention is not
enough to win a war. One can't wave a piece of
paper with an equation or drawing of a weapon
at the enemy and hope that the enemy would wilt,
wither and vanish. War winning technology must
be backed by mass production. Mass production
capability is as .important as any special weapons
system. None of the weapons could have decisive
effect if they were not mass produced and fielded
in the theatre of war in time.
'The future is not what it used to be' is a phrase
coined by the visionary. Arthur C Clarke3. The
West is an ageing, increasingly professional,
.
female and technologically oriented population .
The Third World, with exploding population is
increasingly becoming young. Their people will be
largely unskIlled, impoverished, and have little to
hope for. It is in the Third World countries that
hot spots will erupt, and militaryactions will centre
Mound low intensity conflicts. These people will
be i\rming themselves to the teeth, and use
advanced weaponry. Not withstanding any
rhetoric, and holier-than-thou attitude, some
nations have great stake in keeping the conflicts
Figure 3. Model of war winning technology
Of the plethora of opportunities that science offers,
how can we predict which is war winning technology?
If the limited resources are invested in all promosing
areas, they are spread too thinly to be effective. On the
other hand, if we are choosy, we might just miss the
right technology. We are aware that Patriot missile was
given up as no good, and yet it saved the day in Gulf
War. (c)
As indicated earlier, each innovation c'1ries with it
a penalty and a vulnerability. The adversary may
capitalise on it, make a countermeasure and make the
weapon totally ineffective. This is a continuous cycle
during war and peace times. It is usually during wartime,
until now, that human ingenuity, and heroic acts could
be traced and eulogised. It is now being shifted from
the battlefield to the laboratories, where many a hero
retires unsung.
It may also be seen that inventory never won a war ,
it only kept the war going. It is human ingenuity and
innovation that decides the winner; this is war winning
83
VOL 44, NO I, JANUARY 1994DEF SCI
simmering, with their
dependent on the arms trade
heavilyeconomIcs
The hope lies in exploiting the relationship
between science and economic growth. Is the
outstanding performance of scientists over the past
decades the result of economic grov. th, or the
cause of it? Robert Solow4 (1987 Nobel prize
winner for economics) has demonstrated
quantitatively that economic growth does follow
technological change. Further, the importance and
value to a national economy of investing in the
science is more readily appreciated if the




be viewed with scepticism, discussed (if at all), and
discarded as futile as it is already in public domain. The
minority who use the concept and adopt it to the
situation may win the war. If it is not published but
aired iii'private, it will not be accepted because it is not
published.
Be that as it may, I hazard an illustration: we have
a priori knowledge that, (i) a fly's eye has a lens that
senses a movement though an exact image is not
formed-an aspect of image processing, (ii) through
fuzzy logic, we can handle uncertainty, approximate
and qualitative information to arrive at a fairly accurate
conclusion, and (iii) we can build, and train a neural
network to learn and adapt to an environment,
recognise objects, etc.
We can now conceive of putting together a cluster
of infrared sensors with fly's eye lens that sense
movement, and radiate the information regarding the
movement in a small range to a local receiver. The local
receivers form a cell and a neural network can be trained
to locate, identify , and track a threat day or night. The
central command post can decide the course of action.
Each sensor is so small that it is difficult to locate and
identify. A number of them are distributed randomly
so that loss of a few do not lead to catastrophic failure
of the system but ensure graceful degradation. Nor will
the capture of a few devices let the secret of the system
out. The entire system is disposable as their capture
does n<?t affect use of the same system elsewhere. Since
the number required is large, it can be made very
economical through. mass production. The same
production line can be used for civilian purposes where
each individual infrared detector can be used as intruder
alarm in residences, offices, etc. They can be used for
personal safety in hazardous areas. A. plethora of
applications can be conceived as human ingenuity is
unbounded.
In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment and
with rapid strides in science and techno! -oJ, it is
presumptious to recommend a long term strategy. At
the same time, due to the long gestation period of
development cycle and life of weapons systems, it is
necessary to have a long term plan, however fle~ible.
Upon this contradiction, expedient measures may be
judiciously superimposed. The strategy by. the
advantage of hindsight, is.
(a) Conceptualise, simulate and then evaluate new
and novel systems, prototype and test them,
produce them in limited stock, while all the time
concentrating on their mass producibility. ( design
for production).
(b) Find alternate civilian use with marginal changes
in either the product or the production line to
make production economical.
(c) The new guy in town is consortium. Witness EEC
to fight Japanese economic dominance, Airbus
Consortium to fight other airline gaints, USA and
UK, France and Sweden join to develop torpedos.
Enter into collaboration/consortium, so that
national economy can support reasonable defence
budget and pull out of the technology trap.
6. AN EXAMPLE
A variant of Heizenberg Uncertainty Principle (like
Woodward's Radar Uncertainty Principle) is a~sociated
with the publication of an idea in military matters. Let
us call it Beer's 'Uncertainity Principle'6. The moment
an idea is published it will enter public domain, it will
7. CONCLUSION
Yesterday's war winning technology enters today's
inventory and inventory never won wars. Further, war
winning technology is as much of mass production as
that of any special weapon system.
The potential candidates for hightech war winning
technologies are estimated to be optoelectronics,
remotel y con trolled/pre programmed/ a utonomous
robots to operate in the forward/hazardous areas, new
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material and novel methods of Stealth and signature
alteration of aircraft, ships and submarines.
3 Defence andAnon.- Soaring into 21 century
Diplomacy, 1988.
4 Solow, Robert M. Growth theory. ClarendQn Press
1977.
5 Braben, Donald w. Science and economic growth
Lecture given at Diplomatic Science Club, London
May, 1989.
Night vision aids are the most significant products
of-post-war technology. The implication of continuous
fighting for manpower, ammunition, consumption.
logistics support, and vulnerability of the supply system
are profound. Gulf war demonstrated the power of EW
and should inspire and generate new ideas for
countermeasures and war winning technologies for the
future.
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